Vote No. 493

October 19, 1995, 4:40 p.m. Page S-15324 Temp. Record

CUBAN LIBERTY ACT/Aid to Transitional Government

SUBJECT:

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995 . . . H.R. 927. Graham motion to table en bloc the Dodd amendments Nos. 2906 and 2908 to the Helms substitute amendment No. 1936 to the Dole et al. substitute amendment No. 2898.

ACTION: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO, 64-34

SYNOPSIS: As introduced, H.R. 927, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995, will strengthen sanctions against the communist Cuban government.

The Dole et al. substitute amendment would strengthen international sanctions against the Castro dictatorship in Cuba, develop a plan to support a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and enact provisions addressing the unauthorized use of property of United States citizens confiscated by the Castro dictatorship.

The Helms substitute amendment to the Dole substitute amendment would enact all the provisions of the Dole amendment except for the provisions addressing the unauthorized use of property of United States citizens confiscated by the Castro dictatorship.

The Dodd amendments Nos. 2906 and 2908 would strike the provisions that would set the basic requirements a post-Castro Cuban government would have to meet (the release of political prisoners, the legalization of political activity, the elimination of its secret police agency, the opening of its prisons to human rights inspections, and the scheduling of elections within 2 years) in order to be eligible to receive assistance from the United States.

Debate was limited by unanimous consent. Following debate, Senator Graham moved to table the Dodd amendments. Generally, those favoring the motion to table opposed the amendments; those opposing the motion to table favored the amendments.

NOTE: The Dodd amendments were debated and voted on en bloc by unanimous consent.

Those favoring the motion to table contended:

We have had intensive negotiations with the Administration on this bill. When we discussed the conditions on aid to a transitional

(See other side)

YEAS (64)			NAYS (34)			NOT VOTING (1)	
Republicans Democrats (50 or 94%) (14 or 31%)		Republicans	Der	Democrats		Democrats	
		(14 or 31%)	(3 or 6%)	(31 or 69%)		(0)	(1)
Abraham Ashcroft Bennett Bond Brown Burns Campbell Coats Cochran Cohen Coverdell Craig D'Amato DeWine Donenici Faircloth Frist Gorton Gramm Gramm Grams Grassley Gregg Hatch Helms	Hutchison Inhofe Kassebaum Kempthorne Kyl Lott Lugar Mack McCain McConnell Murkowski Nickles Pressler Roth Santorum Shelby Simpson Smith Snowe Specter Stevens Thomas Thompson Thurmond Warner	Bradley Breaux Bryan Conrad Dorgan Ford Graham Hollings Kerry Lautenberg Lieberman Reid Robb Rockefeller	Chafee Hatfield Jeffords	Akaka Baucus Bingaman Boxer Bumpers Byrd Daschle Dodd Exon Feingold Feinstein Glenn Harkin Heflin Inouye	Johnston Kennedy Kerrey Kohl Leahy Levin Mikulski Moseley-Braun Moynihan Murray Nunn Pell Pryor Sarbanes Simon Wellstone	EXPLANAT 1—Official I 2—Necessar 3—Illness 4—Other SYMBOLS: AY—Annou AN—Annou PY—Paired PN—Paired	nced Yea nced Nay Yea

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government, we were all in agreement that it would be helpful to know ahead of time the required conditions. In accordance with the Administration's wishes, the specific requirements are pretty basic: political activity must be legalized, elections must be scheduled, the secret police must be disbanded, and political prisoners must be released. If our colleagues think we should give aid to a transitional government if it does not take these steps we will be interested to hear it. In addition to these requirements, the bill also lists factors that the President should consider in deciding if a post-Castro government is sufficiently moving toward democracy to warrant giving it assistance. For instance, the bill asks the President to consider whether the post-Castro government protects human rights. Again, if our colleagues think any of the particular items listed should not be considered, we will be happy to listen to their objections.

Some Senators have suggested that it is unprecedented to attach conditions on aid to a government that does not yet exist in anticipation of that government coming to power. Perhaps so, but that is nothing about which to brag. The United States should not conduct its foreign policy by reflexively responding to world events. The leader of the free world should lead by anticipating changes and preparing for changes. This bill will result in the United States carefully planning out ahead of time how it will help Cuba on the road to freedom.

Our colleagues' amendments are misguided. If Senators think we should refuse to think out beforehand how to respond helpfully to changes that are likely to occur soon in Cuba, then they should vote in favor of the Dodd amendments. If they agree with us, and in this case even the Clinton Administration, that it is better to prepare ahead of time, they will vote to table them.

Those opposing the motion to table contended:

The restrictions that would be stricken by the Dodd amendments would unduly hamper the ability of this country to provide assistance to a post-Castro government. These restrictions go on for page after page, saying precisely the conditions that a post-Castro government must meet, and the conditions that it should meet, in order to receive aid. These restrictions are really rather severe. Had similar conditions been placed on aid to the nations of the former Soviet Union or to the nations of Eastern Europe when they first escaped communism aid could not have been given. Without aid, those countries could have easily slipped back into totalitarianism. The United States has never before applied restrictions on aid to a government before it even existed, and it should not start now. Therefore, we urge our colleagues to support the Dodd amendments, which would strike these ill-considered restrictions from the bill.